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I. Introduction
Arbitrability is concerned with whether a particular type of dispute is amenable to settlement by arbitration, or if instead jurisdiction lies exclusively with the domestic courts or state organs. These determinations are usually made by reference to domestic statute law. 1 The parties to a dispute, when considering whether its subject matter is arbitrable, must ensure the said dispute is arbitrable not only in accordance with the law of the lex arbitri, but that it also conforms to the laws and public policy of the governing law of the contract and of those states where enforcement of the award will be sought. It should be said that some confusion exists with regard to the precise terminology associated with the concept of arbitrability. In Europe the term refers, as explained above, to the permission granted by state laws for a dispute to be settled by arbitration, rather than compulsory judicial settlement. In the United States, it has taken on an additional overtone. There, the term has been consistently employed to determine whether an arbitral tribunal has sufficient jurisdiction to hear a dispute as a matter of construction of the arbitral clause, 2 as well as whether the arbitrators may validly * Professor of Public International Law and Deputy Head, Brunel Law School. The author would like to thank Dr Mihail Danov, as well as the two anonymous reviewers in respect of numerous helpful insights, although the usual disclaimers are applicable.
1 National Arbitration Acts are not usually elaborate on this matter and only set out a general framework or principles. For example, the US Federal Arbitration Act provides that: 'A written provision in … a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract … shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable', 9 USC § 2 (1988). Equally, on the basis of s 1030(1) of the German Arbitration Act, arbitrability generally extends to 'any claim involving an economic interest'. The same is true, albeit in somewhat different language, in s 1 of the 1999 Swedish Arbitration Act, whereby 'disputes concerning matters in respect of which the parties may reach a settlement' may be submitted to arbitration. On the basis of the lex specialis derogat lex generalis and the lex posterior rules, newer in time, or specialised Statutes may introduce certain exceptions to the arbitrability of particular types of disputes. In Australia, a similar position is adopted in s 7(2)(a) of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth hear a dispute that has already been decided in a different forum. 3 To a European arbitration lawyer, the functions raised by these cases necessarily refer to an examination of the tribunal's jurisdiction as a result of the contract -and not public law -while the second may turn on the tribunal's Kompetenz-kompetenz authority.
In any event, such questions do not pertain in the slightest to the notion of arbitrability that is analysed in this article. Matters of arbitrability are generally encountered either at the early stages of arbitral proceedings, at the moment when the arbitration clause is triggered, or in the final stages, at which time the winning party seeks enforcement. When encountered in the early stages, it may be raised by anyone of the parties, not the arbitrator. Given that arbitrability may only concern the laws of a country other than those of the lex arbitri, there is no reason why the arbitrator need be concerned and raise the issue himself. Where the lex arbitri renders a particular dispute non-arbitrable, it should not be presumed, in the absence of an express provision in the relevant laws of the lex arbitri, that the arbitrator is obliged to consider this matter proprio motu. Depending on the particularities and subject matter of each dispute, the parties may well decide to choose as the seat of their arbitration a jurisdiction where the subject matter of their dispute is arbitrable. It may very well transpire that although the dispute is not arbitrable in that jurisdiction either if it was of a wholly domestic nature, that the lex arbitri of this jurisdiction generally permits arbitration of foreign disputes therein irrespective of their theme. Obviously, the parties will subsequently face the prospect of having their award set aside as unenforceable, unless they reach agreement that they will mutually honour the award without recourse to judicial enforcement procedures. This is not as unlikely as it sounds, particularly if one considers that disputes that are wholly un-arbitrable most commonly involve illicit transactions that the parties do not want to bring to the public domain anyway. A notable example of nonarbitrable awards that the parties are not intent on subjecting to an enforcement procedure concerns disputes between banks and Saudi private investors. Therein, the imposition of interest on the loan triggers the non-arbitrability of the dispute, given the prohibition of interest in Saudi Arabia, rendering moreover the relevant contract void.
This article sets out to discover the possible existence of an underlying theory or policy whereby particular types of disputes may be referred to arbitration rather than compulsory adjudication by regular courts or executive decision. The 1958 New York Convention 4 does not offer any guidance, as its purpose was to create some coherency at the enforcement stage, but does offer some examples in the sphere of public policy, which as will become evident in the course of this article are linked to some degree with the question of arbitrability. Similarly, despite the extensive regulation of even the most minute of affairs in the context of the European Union, arbitrability has not been addressed. With the exception of some vague guidance by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in one case, it seems that the European Union is content with leaving the matter to the particular legislation of member states. This article asks whether as a result of unilateral state practice some coherency has emerged, regional or global in nature, which would help discern a degree of consistent state practice. Are there particular disputes that are never subject to arbitration throughout the world? A strong contender would certainly be the arbitration of crimes between private parties, but here question whether or not this is actually an absolute rule globally on the basis of its underlying rationale. Equally, the classic examples of disputes that are generally cited as being precluded from arbitration are those related to anti-trust (or anticompetitive practices), patents, copyrights, trademarks and tax, among others. This article examines the degree to which these disputes are subject to arbitration through the evolution and globalisation of world trade. The analysis, given the search for a common trend and general rule, takes into consideration the intentions of states in expanding and relaxing their arbitrability laws. The relevant laws and jurisprudence of Australia has also been considered to a substantial degree. It is evident that financially stronger states cannot rely on the same rationales as their developing state counterparts, since different interests arise between the two. It should become clear by the end of this article that a significant divergence exists between developing and developed states and their thinking behind the concept of arbitrability and its application.
II. The Rationale for Excluding Certain Disputes
Notwithstanding the plethora of national arbitration laws and other domestic statutes by which certain types of disputes are excluded from referral to arbitration, one is at pains to discern a general rule. Certainly, with the exception of Articles II.1 and V.2(a) of the 1958 New York Convention, 5 which itself limits arbitrability only to those disputes that are 'capable of settlement by arbitration', no other binding international instrument has provided a theoretical grounding, or even a list of excluded activities. Arbitrability itself is no doubt closely connected to the concept of public policy, which by definition is circumscribed and delineated exclusively by the internal processes of states. Nonetheless, arbitrability and public policy is not the same thing, but simply complement one another. For one thing, it is possible for a particular type of dispute to fail the arbitrability test in a given jurisdiction (eg relating to intellectual property) and yet not be encompassed within a range of activities offending the public policy of that country. Moreover, the issue of arbitrability arises twofold: a) either as an interlocutory matter, in which case it must be dealt with by the arbitral tribunal or the courts of the lex arbitri before the dispute can go to its merits; or b) at the enforcement stage, at which time even if the award was deemed arbitrable in the lex arbitri, there is no guarantee that the country of enforcement will itself consider it as both arbitrable or compliant with its public policy. Such matters cannot practically arise where disputes otherwise outside the ambit of arbitration have been referred by the parties to arbitration, and where moreover one of the parties is a state and the other a foreign private investor. This is because the limited institutional fora that entertain such disputes, particularly the ICSID Convention, 6 are not subject to the restraints posed by arbitrability and public policy, given that the state party referring said disputes has necessarily excluded them by the very fact of agreeing to submit the dispute. 7 Put simply, the removal of arbitrability constraints on the basis of a bilateral treaty necessarily overrides the arbitrability limitations ordinarily reserved in the statutes of the contracting states. The same is true where the two state parties under the same circumstances choose to refer their dispute to ad hoc arbitration, provided that in their submission agreement (compromis) or their arbitration clause they agree that all issues pertaining to their contractual arrangements are indeed arbitrable. Equally, where a state has referred a dispute with a foreign investor to commercial arbitration and the award has been rendered (eg the International Chamber of Commerce or the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce), the enforcement court of the state that is a party to said arbitration must enforce the award on the same grounds. Refusal to do so will entail the international responsibility of that state for the performance of an unlawful act by a state organ; in this case, the domestic court of enforcement. 8 The invocation of non-arbitrability on the basis of domestic law is no defence for the state entity concerned 9 and will certainly not affect the legal position of third states. 10 Therefore, this discussion necessarily excludes awards rendered by ICSID and the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 11 on the grounds that the tribunals thereto are not examining arbitrability in the traditional sense, but whether the disputes in question are arbitrable under the parties' contract, or covered by a relevant bilateral investment treaty.
Some authors suggest that the lack of arbitrability pertaining to particular types of disputes is premised on the fact that because arbitration is a private proceeding with public consequences, some states prefer to have such disputes entailing public consequences heard in the public domain. 12 only be achieved where cases of this type are referred to civil courts that are not subject to the privacy and confidentiality constraints of arbitration. 13 Others maintain that some states prefer to exclude certain disputes from the ambit of arbitral tribunals because of the 'assumption that an arbitral tribunal would not be able or willing to apply the law as accurately as a judicial court would'. 14 Perhaps the most convincing argument is one that excludes arbitrability for those disputes involving questions regarding the exclusive functions of the state. This would undoubtedly encompass matters such as foreign policy and inter-state relations, fiscal policy, military policy, promulgation of laws, but it is not quite clear if it would also encompass the administration of criminal justice, labour disputes, anti-trust and patent disputes. The former, such as foreign policy, falling within a state's sovereign realm, can under no circumstances be delegated to private entities and as such cannot become the subject matter of arbitral proceedings. In any event, it is hard to envisage a situation where a dispute over foreign or military policy may arise in a contractual context between two private parties, or between a private entity and a state. It is, however, possible for a contractual undertaking to involve elements of foreign or military policy, particularly through agency agreements for the procurement of arms to third states, or the representation of the state in its external relations by a private firm, legal, public relations, auditing, or otherwise. In these cases, the undertakings in said agreements that relate to public functions reserved to the state and that were delegated to the agents, will not be amenable to arbitral proceedings.
The administration of criminal justice on the other hand, although generally within the authority of the executive branch, is not under the absolute authority and function of the state. Thus, in western criminal justice systems, a particular facet of the principle of respect for individual autonomy suggests that with respect to some (2004) offences, it is the prerogative of the victim to pursue the infliction of criminal penalties for the wrongdoer. This is certainly true with regard to assault and battery, and the matter is hotly debated with regard to sexual offences and domestic violence. 15 The rationale for this approach is that criminal prosecution by the state, without the victim's approval, would potentially stigmatise the victim or render him or her more vulnerable. In other systems, particularly those falling within the broader family of Islamic law, it is acceptable for the culprit and the victims, or their respective families, to agree to a final resolution of the 'dispute' through the payment of so-called blood money (diyah). These arrangements are acceptable even in cases of serious offences, such as murder. 16 Thus, although the criminal legislation of some Muslim nations permits under their public policy rules the privatisation of particular aspects of criminal law through the payment of blood money, it does not, on the other hand, deem as arbitrable the perpetration of other offences, thus removing them from the public domain. 17
(a) The arbitrability of labour disputes
This subsection reflects on the permissibility of recourse to arbitration with respect to labour disputes and in light of domestic arbitrability statutes and jurisprudence. This approach is justified on the basis that labour disputes are internal in character. Modern welfare states approach labour relations in a twofold manner. On the one hand they recognise the existence of a contractual relationship between employer and employee, yet on the other hand the state definitively regulates other elements of labour relationship through its public law. This encompasses, for example, the provision and supervision of health and safety, unfair or unlawful dismissal and others. Thus, there exist both private and public perspectives in the relationship of employment. Were this article to argue that only the former are lawfully subject to arbitral proceedings because the latter constitute part of the exclusive authority of the state, then a 'persuasive' employer would be left with the power to insert an arbitration clause in all contracts with employees. While it stands to reason to prevent matters such as health and safety as being arbitrable between the employee and the employer, the power imbalance between the two also suggests that allowing the private law aspects of their relationship to remain arbitrable in no way repairs the imbalance, which the public law argument seeks to address, whereby all matters falling within the exclusive public function of the state may not be subjected to arbitration. In some states, arbitrability of labour disputes may be deemed by the parties as more beneficial to the employee than to the employer, because of particular cultural and jurisprudential circumstances. In such cases, both courts and legislators adapt their legal tools accordingly and provide for wideranging arbitrability. In Alliance Bernstein Investment Research and Management v Schaffran, 18 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was asked to decide, among others, whether the dismissal of an employee for blowing the whistle against his employer, as a result of a federal duty imposed on the employee under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), 19 was arbitrable and whether it was the courts or the arbitral tribunal itself that possessed jurisdiction to decide this matter. The parties were professionally engaged in securities and were subject to the National Association of Security Dealers (NASD) Code. 20 Rule 10211(a) of the NASD Code bound parties to settle disputes arising out of the employment or termination of employment agreement by reference to NASD-based arbitration. The employer argued that this was a case concerned with employment discrimination and as a result did not fall within Rule 10211(a) and should have been submitted to a civil court. The issue at hand does not concern arbitrability, stricto sensu, but it is interesting that the Court of Appeals reiterated Rule 10324 of the NASD Code, which empowers the arbitral tribunal itself to decide its own jurisdiction (essentially an exercise of Kompetenz-kompetenz powers) and proceeded to satisfy the defendant's claim to submit the dispute to arbitration. 21 This case strongly demonstrates that in some jurisdictions the national legislator will consider that the existing standard of regulation in employment relations is sufficient from the executive's point of view so as to permit the parties to submit their disputes to arbitration. Where this was not so, the employees themselves would have refused, through their unions, to be bound contractually to do so and the government would have rendered such matters outside the scope of arbitral tribunals. It should be noted that the relevant parts of the SOX Act are concerned with the criminal ramifications of employee failure to notify the authorities, with the subsequent dismissal of said employee being contrary to (public) law. Given the public character of such law, it is all the more astonishing that disputes arising therefrom are arbitrable. Nonetheless, the United States federal government is happy for such matters to be handled by arbitration, presumably on the basis that such disputes eventually boil down to a compensation claim, the determination for which can just as well be handled by both the courts and arbitral tribunals, given that the compensatory stage of these proceedings are of an essentially private nature. The author is not convinced, however, that issues of this nature entertained The Code was incorporated into the parties' contractual agreements. 21 See also Howsam v Dean Witter Reynolds Inc 537 US 79 (2002), where the US Supreme Court held that the interpretation of a NASD rule imposing a six-year time limit for arbitration was a matter presumptively for the arbitral tribunal, not the civil courts.
under the SOX Act are at any stage purely of a private dimension, given the Act's absolute public character. 22 In Australia, the issue of the arbitrable scope of domestic employment disputes has not specifically been excluded in statute, nor rejected by the courts. 23 Section 652ff of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), while allowing the arbitration of all disputes pertaining to relations arising from the employment contract, renders these, nonetheless, arbitrable only before the Industrial Relations Commission, depriving the parties, therefore, from the choice of other arbitrators or arbitral fora. This is not a serious encroachment to the arbitrable nature of said disputes, because given their limited ambit, access to ordinary arbitration would be far more costly and time-consuming.
III. Arbitrability is Based in each Case on Individualistic and not Communal Interests
In the previous section this article demonstrated the lack of a convincing general rule under which particular types of disputes are not properly subject to arbitration, at least in terms of state practice. This is only natural, given that the public interests of each state are not only different, but also subject to change through the passage of time. In the most developed legal systems, where the range of themes excluded from arbitration are unclear, local courts -or indeed the arbitrators, if unchallenged -may broaden the ambit of arbitrability where they find no real or potential harm to public interest as a result. Equally, states may very well decide that the pursuit of foreign investment during particular historical periods necessitates extending arbitrability to matters that in previous times would have been inconceivable.
(a) The arbitrability of tax disputes
One poignant example is demonstrated by a case involving foreign investment arbitration, between Ecuador and a US corporate investor. 24 The dispute arose because of the action of the authorities of Ecuador in passing a series of resolutions that resulted in the Occidental Exploration & Production Company (OEPC), a United States corporation, not being able to recover the value-added tax (VAT) paid on local purchases and on the import of goods made in connection with export activities. In particular, art 67(1) of the Arbitration Act 1996 (UK), relating to a challenge as to the substantial jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal.
under the terms of Article X of the 1993 USA-Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) 26 such matters fell outside the ambit of the BIT and so could not be the subject of a claim in arbitration under the dispute resolution procedure set out in Article VI of the BIT. Article X of the BIT is entitled 'Tax Policies', and reads as follows:
The Treaty exhorts both countries to provide fair and equitable treatment to investors with respect to tax policies. However, tax matters are generally excluded from the coverage of the prototype BIT, based on the assumption that tax matters are properly covered in bilateral tax treaties.
The Treaty, and particularly the dispute settlement provisions, do apply to tax matters in three areas, to the extent they are not subject to the dispute settlement provisions of a tax treaty, or, if so subject, have been raised under a tax treaty's dispute settlement procedures and are not resolved in a reasonable period of time.
The three areas where the Treaty could apply to tax matters are expropriation (Article III), transfers (Article IV) and the observance and enforcement of terms of an investment agreement or authorization (Article VI (1) (a) or (b)). These three areas are important for investors, and two of the three -expropriatory taxation and tax provisions contained in an investment agreement or authorization -are not typically addressed in tax treaties.
It is clear from paragraphs 2 and 3 of the US-Ecuador BIT that not all disputes relating to tax are outside the ambit of arbitration. On the contrary, the government of Ecuador entering into this BIT consciously declared as arbitrable three distinct types of tax disputes. The High Court succinctly noted that although each state party had agreed, under the terms of the BIT, with the other to 'strive' with respect to its 'tax policies', Article X.2 expressly stated that 'nevertheless the provisions of the Treaty, and in particular Articles VI and VII, shall apply to matters of taxation only with respect to the following …' 27 The court, therefore, had no problem in ascertaining a limited arbitrability in relation to a closed number of tax disputes:
To my mind that wording makes it clear that, apart from matters of taxation that come within the three identified exceptions, all matters of taxation are outside the ambit of the BIT. The Submittal Letter of the Secretary of State to President Clinton explains that this general exclusion is based on the assumption that tax matters are properly covered in bilateral tax treaties between States. That explanation seems plausible. Therefore, in my view, unless a particular "matter of taxation" comes within the ambit of Article X.2 (a), (b) or (c), then the dispute resolution provisions of the BIT in Article VI cannot apply to any dispute that arises between a State and an investor in relation to that "matter of taxation". 28 Given the US-Ecuador BIT is premised on a United States Model BIT, 29 it is logical to assume that many other states have agreed to similar tax arbitrability provisions in other treaties. In fact, a procedure known as Mutual Agreement 31 The European Union Arbitration Convention procedure is not far removed from the normal strands of arbitration. The taxpayer is not contractually bound with any of the states that tax individuals, this being a unilateral act on the basis of public law. While, however, the taxpayer is excluded from the European Union's Convention's 'arbitral' process, the competent authorities of the states concerned contractually agree to submit double taxation claims to arbitration on the basis of Article 7(1) of the European Union Convention itself, which in this sense serves the same purpose as an arbitration clause in a private-law contract. The parties to this arbitration clause are the concerned states and no further submission agreement is required (compromis) before the advisory commission assumes responsibility. The fact that the parties to the arbitration clause are states in no way invalidates the application of an arbitral process, given that states are quite capable of settling their disputes before arbitral fora. It is also perfectly normal for the parties in the present instance to submit to arbitration disputes that arose out of a claim invoked by private entities. This is so because the imposition of tax is always a matter falling within the exclusive sovereign authority of the executive and in any event the competent authorities are representing the legal interests of the taxpayer. Moreover, the advisory commission constitutes a species of institutional, rather than ad hoc, arbitration. 32 The MAP in the OECD Convention is initiated by tax authorities, unlike the European Community Arbitration Convention, but in both cases although the proceedings are described as arbitral they in fact resemble a species of diplomatic protection, albeit with the active participation of the interested private party. 33 Equally, tax disputes should be considered as arbitrable, even in the absence of a specific provision in state-investor agreements, where the unforeseen tax is a disguised expropriation, 34 or in any other event where a grandfathering clause has been inserted in the contract. The arbitrability of matters that touch upon otherwise sensitive areas of exclusive governmental competence is premised primarily, if not exclusively, on the negotiating power of the host state. Thus, in the OEPC Case, Ecuador had little negotiating power vis-à-vis the United States and in its pursuit of attracting badly needed foreign investment was forced under the circumstances to succumb to the United States Model BIT, which renders particular tax matters arbitrable between the host state and the foreign investor protected by the BIT. Moreover, states with smaller, yet healthy, economies choose to exclude certain commercial sectors or activities from the scope of international and domestic arbitration, although disputes arising out of these activities and sectors are based on contractual or quasicontractual undertakings, such as agency agreements. 36 In the case of international arbitration the restriction to arbitration is justified usually by the desire to control the relevant markets, currency exchanges, to prevent dominant and abusive behaviour by the foreign party and to protect the local employment market, among others. No doubt, the assistance to particular economic actors or sectors of the economy viewed as vital, in conjunction with a geographically limited state Grand-fathering clauses generally provide for the 'freezing' of the authority of the state vis-à-vis the investor in the parties' future relations. As a result, no law that the state, or its affiliated entities, promulgates after the signing of the contract has any effect on the investor. idiproject.com/docs/news/Supreme%20Court.def.pdf> (in Arabic). The Law, therefore, was promulgated with a view to protecting him, whereas it is assumed that because the compromis is drafted following the appearance of a dispute, the parties are at a relative parity. The same is true with respect to contracts under ss 43 and 19 of Australia's Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) and the Insurance Act 1902 respectively, which permit recourse to arbitration only through a compromis. Equally, claims for relief under s 106 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (Cth) were held to be out of bounds for arbitration, in Metrocall Inc v Electronic Tracking Systems P/L (2000) 52 NSWLR 1. encompassing a relatively small local population may act as an incentive to restrict arbitrability in a single area of commerce and not in others. 37 The Australian paradigm suggests that it, too, is protective of certain commercial activities and has, therefore, by statute refused to allow recourse to arbitration in respect of these. The most prominent example is section 11 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1991 (Cth), according to which an arbitration clause incorporated in a bill of lading, or similar instrument, and pertaining to the international carriage of goods to and from Australia, is void, unless the said clause designates Australia as the seat of the arbitral proceedings. 38 In the case of domestic arbitration, the most significant reason for imposing arbitrability restrictions seems to be the protection of particular commercial or trade activities.
Yet, it is also quite possible for a neighbouring state with more or less the same socio-economic circumstances to render particular activity arbitrable, deeming that to do so will generate more jobs and investment in the long run, even if this necessitates the imposition of a commercial disadvantage for local merchants. 39 Developed economies, such as that of the United Kingdom, no longer pose such restrictions. The ability of such states to generate investment and funds constantly means that there is no need to protect the local merchants from commercial disadvantages. In English law, an undisclosed principal may enforce an arbitration clause entered into by his agent on his behalf and can do so in his own name. The agent may also commence proceedings in his own name, although this may raise particular issues as to the type of loss he can recover. 40 Equally, large economies that generally attract significant foreign investment without much effort do not as a rule accept bilateral investment treaties that undermine their authority in areas under their exclusive competence. This is particularly true in the case of Russia and its 1995 Production Sharing Act. 41 Under section 22 of the Act, arbitrability is extended to disputes regarding the performance, termination, or the validity of the production sharing agreement (PSA), where these relate to the contractual arrangements of the parties. It is not clear, however, that the PSA is exclusively and always of a private character, or whether it implicitly incorporates elements of 37 The UAE Federal Supreme Court has held that a foreign arbitration clause in a registered commercial agency agreement is unenforceable ( public law, which are not subject to arbitration. Given that PSAs are to be construed in conjunction with the relevant provisions of the Production Sharing Act, which in turn refers to other Russian legislation that de-privatises certain areas of law pertinent to PSAs, particularly licensing, taxation and export regulation, 42 any disputes arising in these spheres can only be settled by negotiation or by reference to the civil courts of Russia. 43 In fact, a developed economy such as that of Russia, wherein many suitors are willing to invest can afford to exclude arbitrability from most, if not all, fields of potential investment. However, if it were to do so, such practice would run contrary to the contemporary trend of industrially strong states, whereby all private matters are amenable to arbitration. This will be expanded in more detail in the next section. Equally, strong economies have little problem in excluding certain activities from the ambit of permissible investments as a matter of public policy. 44 The corollary of this practice is that where a principal investment is subsequently used in order to enter into a secondary investment in a prohibited field, any dispute arising from it will be excluded from arbitral proceedings altogether.
The conclusion so far is that the lack of a general rule on the types of activities that are excluded from the purview of arbitrability may be supplemented by the claim that states, at the very least, determine arbitrability on the basis of their power in the international arena to enforce their individual interests. 45 Economically weak states must necessarily extend arbitrability, whether through a bilateral investment treaty or otherwise, to encompass activities they would under different circumstances wish to retain under their exclusive control, whereas economically stronger states are under no such constraints. In practice this is the case, but weak states begin to appreciate the consequences of broad arbitrability only when foreign investors commence arbitral proceedings. The knee-jerk reaction of weak states at this stage is to try to frustrate proceedings through the assertion of non-investor friendly -and at times silly -public policy constructions. 46 An additional consequence is that they also tend to restrict 42 Moss, above n 14, 13. 
IV. Are Developed States themselves under Pressure to Expand Arbitrability?
There are two propositions to this argument. The first is that financially strong states never extend arbitration over matters falling within their exclusive authority and if in fact they seem to be so doing they only permit arbitrability of disputes that encompass foreign elements. Second, strong states may extend arbitrability over disputes otherwise regulated under public law, but they will do so only with regard to the private dimension of the said public law. These two propositions are now more closely examined.
(a) Private enforcement of anti-trust disputes
In Scherk v Alberto-Culver, 47 a United States corporation purchased three European businesses, but later claimed that the seller had fraudulently misrepresented the status of particular trademarks, which were supposedly registered in Europe, in violation of Article 10(b) of the 1934 US Securities Exchange Act. 48 The plaintiff sought damages in the United States and the crucial matter was whether the arbitration clause entered into between the parties was operative, given that the dispute concerned trademarks, a matter for which the foreign authority that issued them was presumed to have held exclusive authority. While arbitrability over the same issue in the United States would have been precluded where the trademarks had been issued by and registered in the United States, the Supreme Court took a different stance on account of the fact that the dispute arose in a foreign jurisdiction. It held that the parties' agreement to arbitrate any dispute arising out of the purchase agreement was enforceable under the US Federal Arbitration Act. 49 The Court distinguished Wilko from Scherk on the ground that the former was governed in toto by United States law, whereas the governing law of the Scherk contract was foreign and, moreover, if the arbitration clause was not ultimately enforced, a plethora of international conflict-of-laws would arise. It explained this as follows:
Alberto-Culver's contract to purchase the business entities belonging to Scherk was a truly international agreement. Alberto-Culver is an American corporation with its principal place of business and the vast bulk of its activity in this country, while Scherk is a citizen of Germany, whose companies are organised under the laws of Germany and Liechtenstein. The negotiations leading to the signing of the contract in Austria and to the closing in Switzerland took place in the United States, England and Germany and involved consultations with legal and trademark experts from each of those countries and from Liechtenstein. Finally, and most significantly, the subject matter of the contract concerned the sale of business enterprises organised under the laws of and primarily situated in European countries, whose activities were largely, if not entirely, directed to European markets.
Such a contract involves considerations and policies significantly different from those found controlling in Wilko. In Wilko, quite apart from the arbitration provision, there was no question but that the laws of the United States generally, and the federal securities laws in particular, would govern disputes arising out of the stockpurchase agreement. The parties, the negotiations and the subject matter of the contract were all situated in this country and no credible claim could have been entertained that any international conflict-of-laws would arise. In this case [that is, Scherk], by contrast, in the absence of the arbitration provision considerable uncertainty existed at the time of the agreement and still exists concerning the law applicable to the resolution of disputes arising out of that contract. 50 As a result, the matter was open for arbitration because the Court viewed the fraudulent misrepresentation of the trademarks in the same light as a breach of a warranty claim. If both parties were American and the dispute concerned a United States trademark, the result would have probably been different. Importantly, the Court was asserting that no executive or public policy implications arose in the forum by the granting of arbitrability to a dispute that is not arbitrable in those other states that have a direct interest therein. In effect, in the present instance, no reciprocity of arbitrability is recognised by the United States vis-à-vis third states. To what degree this practice is acceptable in international relations is debatable, but whatever the outcome it certainly does not expand the boundaries of arbitrability for the United States.
It did not, therefore, involve a big step for the Supreme Court to conclude that other matters with foreign elements, such as anti-trust, could be subject to arbitration, despite the fact that United States district courts had previously rejected arbitrability with regard to anti-trust disputes because of the large numbers of people affected and the widespread infliction of financial damage, which only federal authorities had the means to cope with. 51 This step came about in 1985 in the celebrated Mitsubishi Case. 52 There, the parties involved were incorporated in various jurisdictions, including the United States. A sales agreement had been entered into between Soler Chrysler (a Puerto Rican company), Mitsubishi (a Japanese company) and Chrysler International (a Swiss company), providing for arbitration of any disputes in Japan under the rules of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association, the governing law being Swiss law. Mitsubishi filed a request for arbitration against Soler claiming damages for breach of the sales agreement and Soler counterclaimed under the Sherman Act 53 alleging anti-trust practices. The question for consideration by the Supreme Court was whether or not the counterclaims for antitrust breaches were arbitrable. The fact that the plaintiff argued that the matter be settled in accordance with the parties' contractual undertakings through arbitration did not entail an expectation that the arbitral tribunal examine the anti-trust violation with the purpose of punishment and the imposition of fines. These functions remain within the exclusive prerogative of the state. Neither did the plaintiff entertain the demand that the arbitral award settle the matter for the future with respect to all interested parties. The claim only concerned losses incurred as a result of one of the parties' anti-competitive behaviour. The Supreme Court, therefore, by a majority of five to three it should be emphasised, decided that international contracts of this nature were arbitrable under the Federal Arbitration Act. It concluded that:
concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties' agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context. 54 The result is truly astounding. A determination that domestic anti-trust arbitration is permissible under the same set of facts would have perhaps made more sense, although still clearly not fully in conformity with United States federal law at the time. Although it will be surprising if the United States Supreme Court denies recourse to arbitration for purely domestic anti-trust disputes, there is equally no supportive jurisprudence to suggest otherwise. While it is true that the alleged violation in the Mitsubishi Case took place in the United States, it is also a fact that the other parties to the transaction were domiciled in other jurisdictions, as was also the forum of the arbitral tribunal. To rule, however, that it is out of respect to international comity that foreign anti-trust disputes are amenable to arbitration in the United States, or abroad, when not subject to arbitration in the countries where the violation took place 55 clearly makes a mockery of the principle itself. 56 The Court would have done well to apply a reciprocity test to such a sensitive issue. It did, nonetheless, point out quite correctly that irrespective of whether such a 54 Mitsubishi judgment, above n 52, 628. In fact, the United States is a champion in entertaining private anti-trust suits through the employment of extraterritorial jurisdictional tools in defiance of comity. In dispute is deemed arbitrable in the United States, the parties should not perceive this as a guarantee that the enforcement state will not refuse to recognise an award of this nature. 57 Equally, the Court was quick to point out that if the 'choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations', it would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy. 58 61 This judgment paved the way, unlike its Mitsubishi counterpart, for the arbitrability of all securities disputes, irrespective of whether they may be designated domestic or international. This is clearly the right solution if the argument of the Supreme Court is based on claims of reciprocity. The United States obviously desires that its nationals are able to arbitrate the private contours of anti-trust disputes with other contracting parties throughout the world. The only way to do this is to take the bold step and open up its doors first and then to foster its bilateral and multilateral relations in such a way as to render arbitrability a reciprocal necessity with its commercial partners. Thus, while the judgments extending recourse to arbitration in the field of securities referred to domestic arbitration, the transnational character of said transactions in the United States necessarily rendered the judgments relevant to international arbitration. It is of no surprise, therefore, following the Shearson judgment that European Union member state courts and national legislators enabled the arbitrability, albeit reluctantly, of the contractual elements of anti-trust disputes. 62 A test of reciprocity by the Mitsubishi court would have made it abundantly clear that anti-trust disputes were not at the time validly subject to arbitration in every country in the world; if indeed it was the United States Supreme Court's desire to promote international comity. In Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v Benetton International NV, 63 the defendant challenged two arbitral awards before the Supreme Court of the Netherlands on the grounds that they were contrary to Dutch public policy that was consistent with the anti-competition provisions of the European Community Treaty (formerly art 85), 64 which sets forth rules on 57 Mitsubishi judgment, above n 52, 628. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome) (25 March competition applicable to undertakings. Under the relevant Dutch law, an arbitration award is contrary to public policy if its terms of enforcement conflict with a mandatory rule so fundamental that no restrictions of a procedural nature should prevent its application. The Supreme Court referred the matter to the ECJ, asking whether European Community competition law constitutes such a fundamental mandatory law. The ECJ ruled that:
A national court to which application is made for annulment of an arbitration award must grant that application if it considers that the award in question is in fact contrary to Article 81 [EC Treaty], where its domestic rules of procedure require it to grant an application for annulment founded on failure to observe national rules of public policy. 65 The ECJ's ruling is ambiguous and it is not clear whether similar disputes are always arbitrable, or whether the arbitrator is required to always apply European Union law, or simply take cognisance of it for the purposes of the proceedings' substantive law. 66 Some commentators have interpreted it as implying that where the contract giving rise to arbitration is governed by the law of a European Union member state, then the tribunal has a duty to apply fundamental principles of European Union law, otherwise the award may be rendered unenforceable. An additional interpretation suggests that where the contract giving rise to the arbitration is governed by the law of a non-European Union member state, the tribunal and the parties will do well to consider such fundamental principles of European Union law, particularly if they envisage enforcement in the territory of a European Union state. 67 As a matter of state law, it is very clear that all European Union member states permit the arbitrability of the contractual elements of antitrust disputes, whether by general language, or specifically. 68 This 'opening of doors' from the United States has enabled other developed states, other than from the European Union, to abandon restrictive practices with respect to anti-trust disputes. 69 The second proposition cited in the beginning of this section has been partially proven. That is, developed states, even where they expand the ambit of their arbitrability rules, do so only with regard to the private dimension of said claims and disputes and not with respect to the public law elements. The risk of control lost by the state is minimal and in any event governments are aware of the significance of confidentiality relating to many business disputes, which the parties want to remove from the public domain and from their competitors. Section V better assists the reader in conceptualising this argument by reference to disputes arising in the field of intellectual property. 
(b) The Australian position
The Australian experience has been somewhat confusing. In their determination as to whether a particular dispute is susceptible to arbitration, Australian courts have declined to focus on the possible existence of a public policy exception to specific commercial or other activities, or whether these are best settled by reference to the courts. The Australian courts have instead tended to concentrate on whether the arbitration clause sufficiently incorporated all the matters under dispute. Thus, contract interpretation has been crucial to the determination of arbitrability and it is no wonder that Australian jurisprudence has not been entirely consistent. 72 The same result was reiterated in Transfield Philippines Inc v Pacific Hydro Ltd, which held that recourse to arbitration was essentially a matter to be decided by reference to party autonomy and its true and unambiguous reflection in the contract, in the presence of which a presumption of arbitrability must be read. 73 Although Australian courts have not been called upon to determine whether disputes relating to anti-trust, securities and similar disputes may be contractually referred to arbitration, the majority of the judgments suggest indirectly that this is indeed possible, because the arbitrator's authority is limited only to those matters arising under contract, and does not extend to powers granted to courts by the country's Constitution. In Tridon it was succinctly observed that:
The question for determination is whether it is competent for parties to an arbitration agreement to agree with one another, in this fashion, to empower the arbitrator to exercise the powers of a Court under the Corporations Act. The purpose of such an agreement could not and would not be to have the arbitrator's award operate as an order of a Court. The arbitrator's determination would be an exercise of consensual In this case, the court confirmed that contractual disputes arising out of Shareholders' Agreements, as well as a company's Articles of Association as between its members, are certainly arbitrable matters. Equally, the High Court of Australia in Tanning Research Labs v O'Brien, in determining the arbitrability of a dispute involving a debt to the creditor of a company in liquidation, held that all private rights and liabilities are arbitrable. 75 And while in Francis Travel Marketing the New South Wales Supreme Court concurred obiter with the United States Supreme Court's subjection of anti-trust disputes to arbitral fora, 76 Justice Allsop's contention in Comandate Marine that disputes concerning intellectual property, anti-trust, securities and insolvency are not arbitrable 77 -although later appealed, but this contention was not challenged by the Court on appeal -is strikingly at odds with his judicial counterparts. The opinion of this author is that a comprehensive reading of the above judgments suggest that where the clear intention of the parties is to settle their difference by reference to arbitration, the courts would generally be willing to stay judicial proceedings, as long as the claims arising out of the dispute were contractual in nature and did not involve the arbitrator passing judgment on matters falling within the purview of the state's public law functions.
V. A Dispute is Arbitrable only between Parties to a Contract or where it is Covered by a Bilateral Investment Treaty (a) Intellectual property disputes
It is a fundamental principle of arbitration that only the parties to an agreement providing for arbitration can be part of such a process and subsequently be legally affected by the award rendered. 78 Moreover, such an agreement must be in writing. 79 Nonetheless, it is also true that as a result of particular conduct or activity, persons who are not contractual parties to that conduct or activity may nonetheless be materially affected. This is so irrespective of whether said activity is legal or illegal. For example, anti-competitive conduct harms the interests not only of the particular businesses that sustain direct losses as a result, but the activity has an additional impact on the masses of consumers and retailers who are coerced into paying a higher price for goods purchased, among others. Those who succeed to agreements by operation of law -for example a trustee in respect to common law trusts it is perceived that the trustee is not appointed by the settlor on the basis of a contract, but a sui generis appointment. 81 Equally, when there is a violation of copyright or patent law, recourse to arbitration, if at all possible, can only arise following the violation -that is, there can never exist an arbitration clause -because the violator will in all probability not be contractually tied to the patent or copyright holder -although as will become evident in this section some countries have catered to this possibility. Moreover, the national authorities will naturally consider that the granting of intellectual and industrial property (IP) rights should be exclusively controlled by the state, as these constitute national assets and contribute significantly to the national economy. As a result, states would naturally wish to defer IP disputes to the jurisdiction of regular courts. At the other end of the spectrum, businesses possessing IP rights, given that in many cases these involve confidential and sensitive information, will understandably desire to prevent airing the content of such rights in the public domain. Arbitration, therefore, is a natural forum for the settlement of intellectual property disputes. It is only natural that developed states will go through all the stages of regulation in order to find the right balance between national control of IP rights and de-centralisation of dispute settlement, with a view to promoting the entrepreneurial qualities of the relevant industries. Up until 1983, patent disputes in the United States were removed from arbitration on account of the 'public interest in challenging invalid patents'. 82 With the adoption of section 294 of the country's Patent Act, which pertains to domestic arbitration and not to international, arbitrability over patent disputes was properly installed. 83 The provision reads as follows:
A contract involving a patent or any right under a patent may contain a provision requiring arbitration of any dispute relating to patent validity or infringement arising under the contract. In the absence of such a provision, the parties to an existing patent validity or infringement dispute may agree in writing to settle such dispute by arbitration. Any such provision or agreement shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, except for any grounds that exist at law or in equity for revocation of a contract. 84 Section 294 refers not to IP disputes generally, but specifically to patent disputes that involve a prior contractual undertaking. Where no contractual undertaking exists, recourse to arbitration is still possible if the disputing entities bankruptcy or under the doctrine of 'universal succession' will become subject to any agreement to arbitrate contained in those agreements. See Euro-Steel v Stinnes AG [2000] 1 All ER 964. 81 In the common law it is permissible for the settlor to provide expressly the power to another individual to appoint a trustee. It is not clear whether such a person may then proceed to appoint himself because he would be deciding that 'he is the best possible person' for the job. See Re Skear's Settlement (1889) 42 Ch 522, per Kay J. subsequently draw up a submission contract (compromis). Obviously, there are some limitations as to the realisation of the latter possibility. Where the disputing entities are incorporated in the United States, it is in the interest of the infringing party to agree to settle the dispute through arbitration because the other patent holder will enforce the rights via United States civil courts, effecting at some point the infringing party. On the other hand, if the infringing party is incorporated in a foreign jurisdiction that does not take the protection of international IP rights seriously, there is no incentive for that entity to submit the infringement dispute to an arbitral tribunal. In such cases, and depending on the size of the alleged infringement, practice suggests that the process of diplomatic protection will constitute the first port of call. The governments of the two states will either negotiate compensation and an end to the infringement, or agree to the submission of the dispute before an appropriate forum. If negotiations of this type fail, the government of the patent holder, as a means of last resort, may impose trade sanctions against the infringing entity. This in itself may act as an incentive to settle through arbitration. In any event, the disputing entities cannot submit to arbitration the determination of whether a patent is valid and accordingly arbitrators do not possess the authority to invalidate patents. 85 This is logical and not surprisingly, the same trend is followed in other developed countries with regard to patent disputes. 86 Equally, transnational disputes arising out of patents, or other intellectual property license agreements, may become arbitrable even where the host state's laws provide otherwise, if the foreign investor's state has entered into a bilateral investment treaty with the host state that does not specifically exclude IP rights as 'investments'. 87 No statutory provision equivalent to section 294 of the Patent Act covers arbitrability of copyright and trademark claims. Nonetheless, United States courts have accepted arbitrability over such claims on the same grounds as those espoused with regard to anti-trust and patent arbitrability. 88 It may seem blatantly obvious in a contemporary legal context, but it should still be emphasised that the fundamental premise for the granting of arbitrability status to IP disputes stems from the contractual relationship of the disputants. The notional incorporation of anti-trust and IP disputes within the realm of nonarbitrability and public policy protection persisted even where the disputants did not challenge any of the public elements of IP and anti-trust. This early stance is evident, for example, in Wyatt Erp Enterprises v Sackman, 89 where trademark infringement was claimed by the plaintiff, but only after the expiration of a trademark licence agreement between the parties. The New York District Court rejected the applicability of the arbitration clause in the license agreement on the ground that the parties could only have agreed for it to apply to disputes arising out of the contract and not as a result of an extra-contractual action in tort. 90 This case, as hostile as it may be against arbitration, cannot certainly be construed in a manner that precludes arbitration altogether. On the contrary, it merely precludes arbitration with respect to infringements in tort and then only under the assumption that it could not have been the intention of the parties to submit torts to arbitration. Therefore, were a judge to construe the intention of the parties otherwise, the result would still be capable of complete reversal. 91 Such a result in favour of arbitration in respect of trademarks is also contingent on the breadth of the arbitration clause, as otherwise the civil courts may find the language of the clause restrictive and in doubt choose to limit access to arbitration. 92 A broad-embracing arbitration clause should encompass 'all controversies arising under or in connection with or relating to any alleged breach of this agreement'. 93 Following the previous discussion, an attempt to define the boundaries of 'contractual', as opposed to 'public' elements in IP disputes is warranted. The public element encompasses all those functions that belong exclusively to the executive; particularly the award and registration of the patent or trademark, its qualification as a patent or an improvement to an existing patent, as well as its de-registration. The contractual element involves the use of all rights vested in the patent or trademark by the owner, whether by the owner or through third parties. Where the owner enters into a licensing or other agreement with a third party, which involves both contractual and public elements, the latter will not be susceptible to arbitration. This determination may be made by a court either at the enforcement stage, or indeed earlier. It has to be noted that while the granting and registration of a trademark refers to a public function, there is no compelling argument against the arbitral settlement of a dispute between two or more persons staking a legal claim as to a particular trademark. It is obviously advisable for the entity with the stronger claim to refer to the state authorities for registering its trademark claim, but it should be equally permissible for the disputing parties to settle the matter privately and apply for registration subsequent to, and on the basis of, the arbitral award. Although United States federal courts generally favour arbitration in patent cases over judicial determination, 94 the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals is not absolute, even where the dispute concerns claims arising out of the parties' contract. This is particularly true where a specialised body has been granted by statute concurrent jurisdiction over particular patent issues. This situation arose in Farrel Corp v US International Trade Commission (ITC), 95 in which the ITC's assumption of jurisdiction in a case concerning misappropriation of trade secrets, misrepresentations as to source and trademark infringement, was challenged by Farrel. The ITC's statutory exceptional jurisdiction over particular patent infringements 96 necessarily foreclosed the arbitrability of such claims. 97
(b) Arbitrability of consumer disputes
Quite apart from IP rights, should disputes arising between private corporations and consumers be submitted to arbitration? On the one hand, it may be argued that party autonomy should be respected, but on the other hand, it is also true that the two contracting parties are not necessarily equal in negotiating strength. In the United States, and in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act 1925 (US) (FAA), pre-dispute arbitration clauses are permissible with respect to consumer contracts, as upheld by the United States Supreme Court. 98 This general rule is subject to two exceptions; first, given the right of locus standi before the courts has a constitutional basis, it may not be waived without express and unambiguous agreement, thus necessitating the consumer is fully aware of the implications of the waiver. 99 Second, civil courts will not feel bound to uphold a pre-dispute arbitration clause that is deemed to be unconscionable. Unconscionability will be determined both procedurally and substantively on the basis of the negotiations, disclosure of the arbitration terms, their fairness, inconvenient arbitration venue, as well as other relevant factors. 100 Where the arbitration clause is not unconscionable and the consumer is found to be fully aware of its existence and implications, United States courts are willing to extend arbitrability to statutory consumer protection claims brought in a bankruptcy case. 101 In the European Union, on the other hand, under the terms of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive, 102 pre-dispute arbitration clauses inserted in consumer contracts will be deemed contrary to good faith where they have not been individually negotiated and subsequently any disputes arising therefrom cannot be arbitrated. This development is obviously based on the assumption that consumers will in the majority of cases be severely disadvantaged if arbitration is pursued instead of litigation, although empirical studies demonstrate otherwise. 103 Article 3(3) of the Directive refers to an Annex, which lists some terms that are deemed to be unfair. 104 
VI. Public Policy as Justification for Precluding Arbitrability
The article already discussed the relationship between arbitrability and public policy by explaining a particular dispute may not be arbitrable in a given jurisdiction, yet at the same time not be encompassed within the public policy rules of that country, such as IP disputes. Public policy is most often utilised as a justification to deny recognition and enforcement of an award at the enforcement stage. The courts of the enforcement state may decide that because the arbitral tribunal officiated over a dispute not arbitrable under the laws or public policy of that state, the award produced cannot be enforced. In this sense alone arbitrability is inextricably linked to public policy. The parties to an arbitration clause or compromis, therefore, must ensure in advance their dispute is indeed arbitrable in the desired enforcement state, as well as the lex arbitri, where the arbitration laws of the latter so require. In the particular case of the lex arbitri, where the dispute concerns a claim predicated on a criminal offence, such as corruption, the arbitrator need not necessarily refuse to entertain the said dispute simply because it is a criminal offence in the country where the contract was performed; it must also be found to violate the public policy of the lex arbitri. 105 On the contrary, the principle of separability suggests, as a matter of customary international law and general principles of arbitration law, the arbitration clause survives an otherwise void or voidable contract. 106 As a result, the arbitrator has the authority to examine the dispute if it falls within the purview of the surviving clause. 107 Obviously, this will not help the parties to enforce the award once it is rendered. The crucial question for the purposes of this article is whether there exists a common core of international public policy rules that preclude a tribunal from passing judgment over the substantive elements of particular activity, or subsequent contractual or tort manifestations. All international crimes falling under the jus cogens umbrella would qualify, as would international crimes prescribed under customary international law. Does this mean, however, that the arbitration clause of a contract between two slave merchants survives under the theory of separability where one of the parties claims compensation as a result of poor contractual performance by the other party? 108 If one answers that those disputes are not subject to arbitration, one is asserting the existence of an international or 'trans-national public policy rule' 109 precluding arbitrability on the basis of opinio juris alone, not usus (state practice), because no national court has had the chance of entertaining such cases in the past.
Below the jus cogens and customary law threshold one finds offences that are criminalised in most, if not all, countries, but which do not necessarily constitute public policy impediments to arbitrability. The most common offence encountered by international tribunals is corruption and its various manifestations. Some tribunals have taken the view that corruption-related disputes are not properly arbitrable. 110 stage. In the Lemenda Case, 111 concerning a contractual dispute where an intermediary was obliged to use personal influence in order to obtain a contract in Qatar, Phillips J refused to enforce the contract on the grounds that it was contrary to English public policy, which itself was founded on general principles of morality. Moreover, he found the contract also violated a similar public policy in the country of performance. 112 The theoretical possibility exists, therefore, that where the contractual terms do not offend the public policy of the proper law of the contract and the place of performance, the award is susceptible to enforcement in the United Kingdom. This is exactly what transpired in the Westacre Case. 113 It concerned a contract governed by Swiss law by which the defendants appointed the plaintiffs as consultants for the procurement of contracts for the sale of military equipment to Kuwait. During the arbitral proceedings the Kuwaitis contested that the contract envisaged an element of fraud and bribery and was therefore contrary to public policy. Although the defendants raised the concept of public policy, because this was done before the arbitral tribunal it entailed also a claim of non-arbitrability. The arbitrators held the dispute to be arbitrable on the basis of separability and so did the Swiss Federal Tribunal. 114 The plaintiff obtained leave, ex parte, to enforce the award in England. The Court found that performance of the contract would not have offended the public policy of Kuwait, nor would it have been contrary to its laws. Moreover, the same was true as regards the public policy of Kuwait. 115 The preceding analysis concerns, however, only the laws and jurisprudence of a single jurisdiction, namely the United Kingdom. 116 Each country is free to set up its own public policy and arbitrability rules, so long as these are consistent and do not change in a discriminatory fashion on a case-bycase basis. automatically non-arbitrable. Arbitrability concerns questions of civil law, whereas a convention criminalising particular behaviour concerns obligations that the signatories undertake in the realm of criminal law. Some criminal law conventions, however, encompass also the civil law dimension of certain crimes, such as corruption. This is true with regard to Article 3(4) of the 1997 OECD Convention on Combating the Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Transactions, 117 which urges parties to consider the imposition of additional civil or administrative sanctions. Where this is the case, states parties are under an obligation to enact appropriate civil legislation and the courts, where the matter is dealt with under common law, must take due heed of their country's contractual undertakings. However, even the admonitions of a wide treaty provision akin to Article 3(4) of the OECD Convention does not oblige states to render un-arbitrable disputes relating to corruption; or other crimes as the case may be. Where the treaty provision is not specific enough, the most probable course of action is to permit arbitration under the doctrine of separability, but to refuse recognition and enforcement as a matter of public policy.
(a) Arbitrability and public policy in contemporary Islamic jurisprudence
Public policy considerations have also arisen where the subject matter in question does not constitute a transnational offence, but where, nonetheless, it offends the religious practices of a particular cluster of states. At the same time the said practice can constitute a regular and unproblematic activity in other parts of the world. A poignant example is the prohibition of simple or compound interest in countries adhering to Islam. 118 As a result of its prohibition, all contracts involving the imposition of interest are void and disputes arising therefrom are not amenable to judicial or arbitral resolution. In Islamic fiqh jurisprudence, interest (riba) is defined as 'an increase in one of two homogenous equivalents being exchanged without this increase being accompanied by a return'. 119 Two types of riba are recognized: a) riba al nasiah, relating to a specified increase in return for postponement of, or waiting for, the payment, and; b) riba al fadl, which arises where the increase is irrespective of the postponement and is not offset by something in return. 120 It is the first of these, riba al nasiah, that pervades banking activities and which is therefore prohibited in most systems governed by some form of Shari'a. Given, therefore, that it constitutes a prohibited practice, transactions involving riba al nasiah are not amenable to conciliation, or to arbitration, as a result. 121 The conclusion to be drawn from this is that any banking activities involving the payment of interest, as well as other Islamic banking transactions that are incompatible with the principles of Shari'a, will not only be non-arbitrable, but will, moreover, be declared as void by Saudi courts. 122 The Saudi government, itself, seems to have introduced an exception to the riba-prohibition rule, by inserting a clause in a recent Gas Concession Agreement, whereby interest is to be charged for late payment. 123 Given the agreement provides for arbitration where a dispute arises, all matters relating to the payment of interest for delays are arbitrable. It is not entirely clear whether this is a sole exception, but it is certainly evidence that the riba-prohibition rule is not seen as absolute by the Saudi government and that therefore the pacta sunt servanta rule is not hierarchically inferior to its riba-prohibition counterpart. 124 While the question of arbitrability with respect to an offence relates to an executive decision to whether particular behaviour should be criminalised, the acceptance, or not, of interest is a matter of religious importance in Islam. The emergence of a consensual transnational public policy with respect to the former is harder to achieve because of the particular overriding interests of the states concerned, whereas in relation to the latter consensus is taken for granted because of the express stipulations of the Qur'an. Even so, two states sharing the same religious culture end up expressing the realities of their respective social cultures in law in a different manner.
VII. Conclusion
There is a need to point out certain limitations to a study concerning the existence of a general rule emanating from the laws and judicial practice of states, irrespective of the fact that one is not necessarily looking for a rule of customary international law. This limitation is primarily methodological and concerns a legal researcher's difficulty in accessing the laws, regulations and judgments of most states, let alone subsequently incorporating them into a study without giving the impression of a descriptive and statistical treatise. This article has therefore taken account of the major legal systems under the following premises: a) that they are most often chosen by the parties as arbitral seats; b) they are, moreover, sought by the parties for the purposes of enforcement, and; c) the laws and judgments emanating therefrom possess a transnational and extraterritorial character (eg the Mitsubishi Case). This article has not been able to discern a customary rule on arbitrability. Given the absence of a treaty provision to that effect, this result is not surprising. However, a general trend is evident. The larger of the developed states, particularly the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union have since the early to mid-1980s favoured a policy of extending the scope of arbitrability to disputes that were previously within the exclusive domain of national courts or the authority of the executive. This coincides, in the United Kingdom, with a wave of privatisations initiated by the Thatcher government and a restructuring of the United States economy by the Reagan administration. It would have been wholly anachronistic of both governments to force private entities to employ the normal judicial system to oversee their disputes, particularly when in most cases, disputes were transnational in nature and where, moreover, speed was of the essence, as was confidentiality. Therefore, the presumption has since been in favour of arbitrability, unless a statutory provision to the contrary so demands, or, exceptionally, where the existence of fraud or corruption forces a judge or arbitrator to rule against the separability of the arbitration clause from the contract itself. In every case, however, the parties are not free to arbitrate on the validity of actions that fall exclusively within the authority of the state (such as the granting of patents, or the determination of the public or criminal law consequences arising from the violation of anti-trust laws). Rather, private entities can arbitrate otherwise non-arbitrable disputes, only insofar as these arise out of a contractual undertaking and so long as the claims arise out of the contract. It is doubtful that the relevant provisions of the European Convention of Human Rights 125 were a significant factor towards this direction in the European context: no case on arbitrability has so far arisen.
For those developing states that entertain, and indeed welcome, the prospect of direct foreign investment, their arbitrability laws are not always shaped by their own particular needs, as economies in need of some protection for local producers and manufacturers. The proliferation of bilateral investment treaties and the imposition of model clauses by the most powerful states have necessarily removed the sovereign prerogative of some developed states, by which they could have otherwise excluded some disputes from commercial, rather than foreign investment arbitration. This result has not only come about as a result of the specific wording of particular bilateral investment treaties regarding arbitrability, but is also implicit from the fact that the concept of 'investment' has itself been expanded in recent years to encompass a range of activities and assets, including intellectual property rights. The liberal trend towards arbitration, despite its national limitations where applicable, is indeed apparent. Whereas even up until the mid-1990s developed states not only tolerated, but implicitly rewarded, corrupt practices by companies incorporated under their laws, it is doubtful that contractual claims arising out of corrupt undertakings may be arbitrated without problems throughout the world. Finally, the extension of arbitrability is not without its share of problems. The precedent in the Mitsubishi Case stipulates that although domestic anti-trust disputes may not be referred to arbitration, transnational disputes of this nature are amenable to arbitration. The Supreme Court's caution that there is no guarantee that such awards will be enforceable even in the United States does little to appease those states that have commenced parallel proceedings on the same set of facts.
